It is commonly argued that weak negative polarity items (NPIs) (e.g., any) can occur in any (Strawson) downward-entailing environment. This generalization, however, is challenged by Wagner's (2006) observations with the NPI-licenser only: although an only-clause is (Strawson) downward-entailing in its unfocused part, NPIs are not necessarily licensed there. In particular, DPonly does not license an NPI that appears within the unfocused part of its left argument (as seen in *Only a chair of any HUMANITIES F department met with the president), and VP-only does not license an NPI if this NPI and the focused item appear within the same island (as seen in *The president only met with a chair of any HUMANITIES F department). These observations suggest that the licensing status of an NPI in an only-sentence is not just determined by the polarity pattern of the environment where this NPI gets interpreted.
Introduction
Negative polarity items (henceforth NPIs), such as the emphatic expression any, are known to be licensed in downward-entailing (henceforth DE) environments (Fauconnier 1975 (Fauconnier , 1979 Ladusaw 1979) . Prototypical DE environments are the following:
(1) Under the semantic scope of negation a.
John didn't read any papers.
b. * John read any papers.
(2) Within the scope of negative quantifiers a. Few/no/at most 3 students read any papers.
b. * Many/most students read any papers.
(3) In the left argument of universal quantifiers a.
Every student who has read any papers passed the exam.
b. * Every student who has read some papers passed any exams.
c. * Some student who has read any papers passed the exam.
(4) In the antecedent of conditionals a. If John knows any big names, he will be invited.
b. * If John is invited, he will know any big names.
An environment is DE if and only if it supports downward inferences from a superset to a subset. For instance, observe the contrast between (5a) and (5b) that a downward inference holds from a term student to a more specific term smart student in the left argument of every, but not in the left argument of some.
(5) a. Every student passed the exam. → Every smart student passed the exam.
b. Some students passed the exam. → Some smart students passed the exam.
Following von Fintel (1999) and Gajewski (2007) , I define DE functions and DE environments as in (6), where the arrow '⇒' stands for generalized entailment. 1 (6) a. Downward entailing functions A function f of type σ , τ is DE if and only if for all x and y of type σ such that x ⇒ y, f (y) ⇒ f (x).
b. Downward entailing environments
If α is of type δ and A is a constituent that contains α, then: (1) Entailing type a. t is a basic entailing type.
b. If τ is an entailing type, then for any type σ , σ , τ is an entailing type.
Following von Fintel (1999) , I define generalized entailment as in (2).
(2) Generalized entailment '⇒' a. If φ , ψ are of type t, then: φ ⇒ ψ if and only if φ is false or ψ is true.
b. If β , γ are of an entailing type σ , τ , then: β ⇒ γ if and only if for all α such that α is of type σ : β (α) ⇒ γ(α).
The basic case (2a) is defined based on truth values: a truth-value entails another if and only if it is not the case that the first is true and the second is false. In a generalized case, as schematized in (2b), a function entails another if and only if the result of applying the first function to any argument entails the result of applying the second function to the same argument. For example, smart student and student are functions of type e,t . smart student ⇒ student , because for any x of type e, smart student (x) ⇒ student (x). All the aforementioned cases can also be understood from a set-theoretic perspective: for any two sets A and B, A ⇒ B if and only if A is a subset of B (written as 'A ⊆ B').
For example, the function λ x. every A/A ′ is B g[A ′ →x] is DE, and hence the sentence "every A is B" is DE with respect to A. The DE analysis of NPI-licensing can now be summarized as follows:
(7) The DE analysis of NPI-licensing An NPI is grammatical if and only if it appears in a constituent that is DE with respect to this NPI.
Nevertheless, the NPI-licensing effect of the exclusive focus particle only, first observed by Klima (1964) , casts doubt on the DE analysis of NPI-licensing: while the NPI any is licensed in (8a) and (9a), these contexts do not seem to support downward inferences (Atlas 1993 (Atlas , 1996 , as shown in (10a) and (10b), respectively. 2 In comparison, the ungrammaticality of (8b) and (9b) shows that the NPI any can be licensed by the overt exclusive particle only, but not by a covert exhaustifier. 3 (8) Right argument of DP-only a.
Only JOHN F read any papers.
b. * JOHN F read any papers.
(9) Unfocused part under VP-only a.
Mary only gave any books to JOHN F .
b. * Mary gave any books to JOHN F .
(10) a. Only JOHN F ate vegetables for breakfast. → Only JOHN F ate kale for breakfast.
b. Mary only gave fruit to JOHN F . → Mary only gave apples to JOHN F .
In responding to the NPI-licensing effect of only, many different positions have been defended in the literature, each of which weakens the strict DE condition to some extent for weak NPIs. For example, the Strawson-DE analysis grants the presuppositions of the consequence when a downward-inference is assessed (von Fintel 1999 , Wagner 2006 , Hsieh 2012 . The grammatical view of NPI-licensing ignores presuppositions and implicatures when the meaning of a weak NPI is evaluated (Gajewski 2012 , Chierchia 2013 ; see fn. 13). The pseudo-anti-additivity analysis (Atlas 1996) and the non-veridicality analysis (Giannakidou 2006 ) each use a weaker condition for the licensing of weak NPIs. It is further observed that the distributional pattern of NPIs in only-clauses is restricted by Fassociation: only cannot license an NPI that appears in its F-associate, as exemplified in (11). For simplicity, I call this fact "Licensing Asymmetry." 2 Here and henceforth, CAPITAL letters mark stressed items, and the subscript ' F ' marks semantic focus. 3 The grammatical view of NPI-licensing (see section 3 and the references therein) assumes that focused items are always associated with overt or covert exhaustifiers. Accordingly, for example, the LF of (8b) contains a covert exhaustivity O-operator associated with the semantic focus JOHN F . Under this view, the contrast between (8a) and (8b) thus suggests that the covert O-operator cannot license NPIs. This contrast is expected by the grammatical view: the O-operator is non-monotonic; unlike only which asserts only an exhaustivity inference, the O-operator also asserts a prejacent inference. See more details in footnote 13.
(11) a. Only [some/*any students] F saw John.
b. Mary only gave [some/*any books] F to John.
Nevertheless, Drubig (1994) and Wagner (2006) observe that Licensing Asymmetry is not solely determined by F-association. In both examples in (12), only does not license the NPI any, although the F-associate of only is just the NP-complement of any.
(12) a. Only [some/*any BOYS F ] arrived.
b. John only read [some/*any PAPERS F ], (he didn't read any books).
Similar facts are observed in (13) and (14) . In these examples, only is associated with narrow focus, and the NPI any appears outside the focus: in (13), the NP-complement of any contains narrow focus; in (14), the anyP serves as an of -argument of the focused NP CHAIR; in (15), the anyP serves as the possessor of the focused NP ADVISOR. Examples (12) to (15) suggest two generalizations. First, DP-only does not license an NPI that appears within its left argument, regardless of whether this NPI is part of its associated focus. Second, VP-only does not license an NPI if this NPI and the focused item appear within the same island. In examples from (12) to (15), I used ' [•] ' to enclose the minimal island that contains the semantic focus. 4 I call these facts uniformly "Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch", meaning that the part of an only-clause where an NPI can appear does not fully match up with the part that is not F-associated with only. 5 In sum, to capture the NPI-licensing effect of only, we need to answer at least three questions:
4
Determiner phrases like anyP can be considered islands, to the extent that the NP complement of a determiner cannot be moved out alone. According to Abels (2003) , the complement of a phasal head -such as the D head anycannot be moved by itself and strand its embedding phasal head, but must pied-pipe that phasal head. 5 There are some seeming counter-examples to this generalization. For example, the NPI any is licensed in (1a), although it appears within the left argument of DP-only. Interestingly, replacing the plural candidates with the singular existential indefinite a candidate makes any not licensed, as seen in (1b). Such a contrast is also observed with VP-only, as shown in (2). I thank Brian Buccola, Gary Thoms, and an anonymous reviewer for the observation.
(1) a. Only (A) Only is not a prototypical DE-operator; why does it license NPIs? (B) Why is it that the NPI-licensing effect of only is subject to Licensing Asymmetry? (C) Why is it that Licensing Asymmetry is subject to Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch?
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and section 3 will review two representative theories on the NPI-licensing effect of only. One is the focus (F)-movement theory by Wagner (2006) , and the other is the grammatical (G-)view of NPI-licensing by Chierchia (2006 Chierchia ( , 2013 . I will show that both analyses have clear advantages but neither of them properly predicts the distributional pattern of NPIs under only. In section 4, I will propose a hybrid analysis that incorporates features of both theories. The main ingredients of the new analysis are the following: (A) Following the G-view of NPI-licensing, I assume that an NPI is licensed if and only if assessing its domain feature [D] does not yield a G-triviality.
(B) I argue that only is not only an NPI-licenser, but also an "NPI-unlicenser": if an NPI is interpreted within the syntactic complement of only and if the prejacent of only is not downward-entailing with respect to this NPI, using only to assess the [D] feature of this NPI returns an inference contradicting the prejacent presupposition of only.
(C) In the case of VP-only association, the requirement of avoiding G-trivialities motivates F-movement. The semantic contradiction in (B) can be avoided if and only if the NPI is interpreted in the remnant VP.
2. The theory of F-movement and its shortcomings Further, von Fintel (1999) argues that "only+NP" is a Strawson DE function: only presupposes the truth of its propositional prejacent (Horn 1969) ; the scope of "only+NP" is DE when the prejacent presupposition of only is satisfied, as shown in (17).
(17) Kale is a vegetable.
x ⇒ y John ate kale for breakfast.
f (x) is defined Only JOHN F ate vegetables for breakfast.
f (y)
The theory of F-movement
The Strawson DE condition, however, still cannot explain why VP-only association is subject to Licensing Asymmetry and why Licensing Asymmetry in general exhibits Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch. In responding to these questions, Wagner (2006) proposes a theory of F-movement. This theory has components in both syntax and semantics, as outlined in the following.
The LF syntax of only
First, both DP-only and VP-only have two syntactic arguments, a restrictor and a scope. In the case of DP-only, the restrictor and the scope correspond to its left argument and right argument, respectively. In the case of VP-only, F-association always invokes covert phrasal movement of the focused expression to the syntactic restrictor of only; thus the restrictor and the scope correspond to the F-moved phrase and the remnant VP, respectively. Anderson 1972 , Jackendoff 1972 , Rooth 1985 ; therefore, when only is associated into an island, the F-moved phrase ought to be the minimal island that contains the focus-associate of only (see also Drubig 1994) . For instance, the F-moved item in (19a) ought to be the entire complex DP, and the one in (19b) ought to be the entire when-clause. (20). Only is a two-place predicate; it asserts an exhaustivity inference and presupposes an existential premise. In (20), the arguments α and P correspond to the syntactic restrictor and the scope of only, respectively. The variable C stands for the exhaustification domain; its value is determined by both linguistic and contextual factors.
Note that the presupposition (20b) is unconventional. It clearly differs from the standard prejacent presupposition (i.e., P(α)) assumed by Horn (1969) . It is also weaker than the existential presupposition assumed by Horn (1996) , which is generated by abstracting over the semantic focus, not the entire syntactic restrictor. See (21) for a simple comparison of these three presuppositions. Underlining marks the syntactic restrictor of only. Prejacent (Horn 1969) b. A female inhabitant from somewhere met Particle Man. Existential (Horn 1996) c. Someone met Particle Man. Existential (Wagner 2006) The main purpose for Wagner to weaken the presupposition of only is to capture the phenomenon of Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch. If we assume the prejacent presupposition (21a), we would predict an unfocused part of the syntactic restrictor of only to be Strawson DE. Compare the following two lines of reasoning for illustration. In both lines of reasoning, the premise grants the prejacent inference of the consequent only-sentence. In (22), the downward inference from the focused NP student F to its subset [junior student] F does not hold, while in (23), the downward inference from the unfocused item inhabitant to its subset female inhabitant does hold.
(22) A junior student is a student.
x ⇒ y A junior student met Particle Man.
f (x) is defined Only a student F met Particle Man.
The same problem arises if we adopt Horn's (1996) (27) Maximize Presupposition Principle (Heim 1991) Out of two sentences which are presuppositional alternatives and which are contextually equivalent, the one with the stronger presuppositions must be used if its presuppositions are met in the context. This idea brings up Wagner's assumptions on syntax and semantics: "F-movement minimizes the size the of the syntactic restrictor, which may have an effect on the strength of the statement that is grammatically encoded by the sentence." Consider the basic only-sentence in (28) for illustration. F-movement changes the size of the syntactic complement of only, as marked by underlining: the syntactic complement of only encloses the entire VP "played BASKETBALL F " in (28a) but just the semantics focus "BASKETBALL F " in (28b). Next, the existential presupposition triggered by only is obtained by abstracting over the entire VP in (28a), while over the focused noun phrase in (28b). Hence, the only-sentence obtains a stronger existential presupposition based on the F-moved form (28b). Finally, in the spirit of the MP Principle, the F-moved form is more preferable than the non-F-moved form. 
Consequences
Wagner (2006) claims that the theory of F-movement is followed by two general restrictions on the NPI-licensing effect of VP-only, namely, the Island Restriction and the Head Restriction, as described in the following:
If only is associated with the head of a constituent, it does not license an NPI in the complement of the head.
(30) Island Restriction Association with a constituent within an island cannot license an NPI that appears in the same island.
The Head Restriction comes from the standard view that F-movement is phrasal movement: a head cannot take phrasal movement; therefore, when only is associated with a head, the F-moved item has to be the entire projection of this head. For instance, in (31), the F-moved element has to be the entire VP, including the anyP; therefore, the NPI any is interpreted within the syntactic restrictor of only and is not licensed.
(31) * John only [CUT F any vegetables]. (Wagner 2006: 310) The Island Restriction follows Wagner's assumption that F-movement is sensitive to islands. For instance, in (32a), only is associated into the because-clause, which is an island; therefore, the F-moved item must be the entire because-clause, which contains an NPI any. In (32b), in contrast, the NPI anyone is outside the because-clause and therefore is not involved in F-movement. 6 (32) a. * Mary only gave a book to John [because BILL F gave any book to him].
b.
She only gave anything to anyone [because YOU F did]. (Wagner 2006: 313) 2.3. Problems with Wagner (2006) Wagner (2006) has convincingly argued that F-movement is needed for predicting the NPI-licensing effect of only, especially for unifying the Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch behaviors of DP-only and VP-only. DP-only does not license an NPI that appears in its left argument, even if it is not associated with this NPI. Analogously, VP-only does not license an NPI if this NPI and the focused item appear within the same island, regardless of whether this NPI itself is focused. By virtue of F-movement, whatever explanation that works for DP-only will also work for VP-only. Nevertheless, Wagner's explanation of Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch is infeasible: contrary to what he claims, with the weak existential presupposition (20b), an only-clause actually is Strawson DE with respect to any unfocused position (section 2.3.1). Moreover, in Wagner's account, the F-movement operation is not well-motivated or properly controlled (section 2.3.3 and 2.3.3).
Problems with Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch
Recall that Wagner weakens the presupposition of only, so as to avoid overly predicting an unfocused position in the syntactic restrictor of only to be Strawson DE. This attempt of eliminating Strawson DE-ness, however, is infeasible. The seeming failure of licensing a Strawson-downward inference in (26), repeated below, involves confusions between natural language semantics and meta-language interpretations.
(33) A female inhabitant is an inhabitant.
x ⇒ y Someone met Particle Man.
To be more concrete, I suggest that the reason why the above reasoning is invalid is that the actual presupposition of the consequent only-sentence is stronger than what has been provided in the premise. The actual presupposition might be Horn's (1969 ) prejacent presupposition, Horn's (1996 existential presupposition, or Ippolito's (2008) conditional presupposition (see (42) ii. Presupposition: John did something.
In sum, the weak existential presupposition of only cannot help with explaining the phenomenon of Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch. Wagner's account predicts that an only-clause is Strawson DE as well as DE with respect to any unfocused position.
Problems with the presupposition of only and "why move?"
Recall that Wagner uses the MP Principle to motivate F-movement: the presupposition of only is obtained by abstracting the syntactic restrictor; F-movement reduces the size of the syntactic restrictor and hence strengthens the existential presupposition. In this section, I will show that only triggers either a prejacent presupposition or a conditional presupposition, the involvement of which makes the MP-based analysis of motivating F-movement untenable.
Wagner has noticed that the definition of only in (20) is too weak to account for sentences like (37), where only is associated with a conjunction. Intuitively, the sentence in (37) cannot be uttered if Sue invited only John, although the asserted exhaustivity inference in (37a) and the assumed existential presupposition in (37b) are both satisfied in this context. To predict this infelicity, Wagner adopts McCawley's (1993: 311) idea and proposes that the sentence (37) conversationally implies the prejacent inference in (37c). This implicature is derived roughly as follows. If the speaker believes that Sue didn't invite John or believes that Sue didn't invite Mary, she could have been more informative by leaving the person out of the list. Next, assuming the speaker is being cooperative in the Gricean sense and is well-informed, we conclude that the speaker believes that Sue invited both John and Mary. As argued by Ippolito (2008: 59) , however, the implicature analysis of the prejacent inference has at least two problems. First, it cannot explain why a negative only-sentence also introduces a prejacent inference, as in (38) . If the speaker believes that Sue invited Mary but not John, saying "Sue invited someone who is not John" is less informative than the assumed exhaustive assertion "Sue invited someone who is neither John nor Mary." Hence, we are not able to derive the expected prejacent inference of (38) based on the conversational maxims. Only Mary can speak French, and maybe not even she can.
Related to the second problem pointed out by Ippolito, the contrast between the following two conversations also suggests that the prejacent inference from only is more robust than an implicature from the weak scalar item some: unlike the scalar implicature from some, the prejacent inference affects the truth conditions of the only-clause and is much more difficult to cancel. Hence, the prejacent inference should not be treated as an independent implicature. Instead, we can analyze it as a presupposition (Horn 1969; Rooth 1985 Rooth , 1992 or adopt Ippolito's (2008) analysis that the prejacent inference is a logical consequence of the scalar implicature (42a) together with a conditional presupposition (42b).
(42) Only A is B.
a. Implicature: Someone is B.
(Derived by negating the stronger alternative No one is B.)
In this section, I don't take a position as to which analysis correctly characterizes the presupposition(s) of only, but just show that the MP-based analysis of motivating F-movement is infeasible whichever analysis of presuppositions we follow. Under the presupposition analysis, the existential presupposition -regardless of its strength -is always entailed by and hence collapses under the prejacent presupposition, and thus the MP Principle cannot motivate F-movement. Alternatively, with Ippolito's (2008) conditional presupposition, the MP Principle would predict that the un-Fmoved form is more preferable over the F-moved form: the existential inference is the antecedent of the conditional presupposition; therefore, strengthening the existential inference would weaken the presupposition. To be more concrete, consider the example (28) again, repeated below. If following Ippolito's (2008) analysis, we would have conditional presuppositions as follows. Observe that the presupposition in (43b) from the F-moved form is semantically weaker than the one in (43a) triggered in absence of F-movement. 
Problems with "when move?"
Wagner (2006) claims that F-movement is mandatory for VP-only association. I argue that this strong claim leads to two undesired consequences.
First, it incorrectly predicts that an NPI associated with only is always unlicensed, even if this NPI appears under some other licenser. Recall that Wagner's assumptions yield the prediction that only does not license an NPI appearing inside the F-moved constituent. This prediction, together with the claim that F-movement is mandatory for VP-only association, implies a stricter constraint as follows: "VP-only cannot be associated with any NPIs or with/into any NPI-contained islands within which the NPIs are not licensed." This constraint, however, is too strong for cases like (44), where only is associated with an anyP across another NPI-licenser (i.e., clause-mate negation). Wagner (2006: fn. 20) , assuming F-movement to be mandatory overly rules out possible interpretations for sentences like (46), where only is associated with a scopal element at most 3 students across another scopal element want. If F-movement were mandatory, the focused item would have to take only a wide scope reading. 8 Note that the NPI any is not licensed if only merely associates with any, as exemplified below. This is so because (1) doesn't have any excludable alternatives, failing to satisfy the additive presupposition of only.
(1) How much books is such that Mary didn't give to John? *Mary only didn't give ANY F books to John.
Consider the dialogue in (2) for illustration of the additive presupposition. The which-question with a restricted domain ensures that the exhaustification domain of only contains exactly three members, namely, I will invite John, I will invite Mary, and I will invite both John and Mary. The answer (2b) is infelicitous because the prejacent is the strongest one among the alternatives, which therefore makes the additive presupposition of only unsatisfied. In contrast, the answer (2c) is fully acceptable, because a covert exhaustification does not have an additive presupposition.
(2) Which of John and Mary will you invite?
a.
Only JOHN F , (not Mary/ not both).
Likewise in (1), the exhaustification domain contains only propositions of the following two forms: (i) it is not the case that John read some paper in D ′ (D ′ ⊆ D); (ii) it is not the case that John read most/all/... the papers in D. All of these alternatives are entailed by the prejacent and are not excludable. For more discussions on the additive presupposition, see Klinedinst (2005) , Beaver and Clark (2009) , among others.
She only wanted to kiss [at most 3 students] F .
To account for the correct scope readings, Wagner (2006: fn. 20) proposes that the F-moved item undergoes obligatory semantic or syntactic reconstruction. Nevertheless, if reconstruction were always feasible, then the focused anyP in (47) should also be reconstructed and licensed within the scope of VP-only, contra fact.
(47) * Mary only wanted to read [any books] F .
A defender of the reconstruction analysis might argue that only must be reconstructed in company with the F-moved phrase. Under this assumption, (47) would be interpreted as '*Mary wanted to read only [any books] F .' Nevertheless, this assumption is incorrect, because VP-only takes rigid scope reading (Taglicht & Randolph 1984 , Rooth 1985 , Bayer 1996 , as exemplified in (48). (48) John is only required to meet MARY F .
( OK only > required; # required > only)
3. The G-view of exhaustifications
The G-view of scalar implicatures
The grammatical (G-)view (Fox 2007 , Chierchia et al. 2012 was first introduced to analyze scalar implicatures. This view argues that the generation of scalar implicatures is not purely due to pragmatics (compare Grice 1975) , given the fact that scalar implicatures can be generated in embedding contexts. The main ingredients of the G-view are summarized as follows. First, propositions with scalar items are associated with sets of alternatives, which are computed in the same way as answer sets of questions (Hamblin 1973) and alternative sets of focus (Rooth 1985 (Rooth , 1992 (Rooth , 1996 . A recursive definition of alternative sets is schematized as follows:
(49) Alternative sets a. For any lexical entry α, ALT(α) = i. { α } if α is lexical and does not belong to a scale;
ii. { α 1 , ..., α n } if α is lexical and part of a scale α 1 , ..., α n ;
Where ALT is a function from expressions to a set of interpretations.
b. ALT(β (α)) = {b(a) : b ∈ ALT(β ), a ∈ ALT(α)} Next, alternatives keep growing until factored into meaning via a covert exhaustivity operator O (or written as "EXH"). This O-operator affirms the prejacent and negates all the alternatives that are not entailed by the prejacent, as schematized in (50). 10 The non-entailed alternatives are also called excludable alternatives.
Accordingly, a scalar implicature is derived as a logical consequence of applying an O-operator over a sentence containing a scalar item. For instance, in (51), applying an O-operator over the bare some-sentence φ SOME affirms the prejacent φ SOME and negates the stronger scalar alternative φ ALL , yielding the scalar implicature ¬φ ALL .
(51) a. Some of the students came. → Not all of the students came.
b. ALT(φ SOME ) = {φ SOME , φ ALL } c. O(φ SOME ) = φ SOME ∧ ¬φ Here, since the prejacent S is upward-entailing (henceforth UE) with respect to the domain variable D, the proper D-alternatives are all stronger than S and are all excludable. Hence, applying O D yields the exhaustivity inference in (53d). Crucially, the
Note that this O-operator is distinct from the one used by Fox (2007) , which negates only alternatives that can be negated consistently (viz., the so-called "innocently excludable alternatives"). exhaustivity inference in (53d) contradicts the prejacent inference S . 11 Such a contradiction makes the sentence (53) ungrammatical and the NPI any unlicensed.
(53) * John read any papers.
(John read some papers in the total domain D.)
e. O D (S) = S ∧ (53d) = ⊥ (# John read some papers in D, but for any proper subdomain D ′ , he read no paper in
The contradiction in (53e) is in essence different from the one in (54). The former makes an utterance ungrammatical, while the latter makes an utterance infelicitous but not ungrammatical.
(54) # It is raining and it isn't raining.
To distinguish these two types of contradictions, Chierchia (2013: 49) adopts notions from Gajewski (2002) and describes the contradiction in (53e) as a "Grammatical (G-)triviality". G-triviality is a special form of Logical (L-)triviality: L-trivialities are tautologies or contradictions in the traditional sense; G-triviality refers to a characteristic that a sentence receives the same truth value (true or false) regardless of how the lexical terminals in the structure are replaced. Compare the sentences in (55) for illustration. Expressions like John, smokes, and student are lexical terminals, and the rest are functional terminals. The contradiction in (55a) can be avoided by substituting the two occurrences of smoke with distinct lexical items (as in John smokes and doesn't dance.). In contrast, the meaning of (55b) is always contradictory no matter which lexical items are used. 12 Therefore, we identify (55a) as L-trivial, while (55b) as both L-trivial and G-trivial.
paper in {p1} and John read a paper in {p2}. The proper D-alternatives are not entailed by the assertion. Therefore, applying an O D -operator affirms the assertion and negates both proper D-alternatives, as schematized in (1c), yielding a contradictory inference that John read p 1 or p 2 , and he did not read p 1 , and he did not read p 2 .
(1) a.
(55) a. # John smokes and doesn't smoke.
[ x P and not P ] b. * Some student but John smokes.
[ some P but x Q ] Next, Chierchia argues that the type of contradiction in (53e) can be avoided if the constituent that the O D -operator attaches to is DE with respect to the D variable of any D . Consider the basic negative sentence in (56) for instance. By virtue of negation, all the D-alternatives are entailed by the assertion and therefore not excludable. The O D -operator, although mandatorily present for the sake of feature checking, has no effect on semantics.
(56) John didn't read any papers.
(John read no paper in the total domain D.)
Extending the G-view of NPI-licensing to only
Inspired by Krifka (1995) and Lahiri (1998) , Chierchia (2006 Chierchia ( , 2013 extends the G-view of NPIlicensing to the licenser only. These approaches adopt the lexical entry of only from Horn (1969) , namely, that only asserts an exhaustivity inference and presupposes the truth of its prejacent. The heart of this view is the following: the unfocused part of the asserted exhaustivity inference is DE and hence forms an NPI-licensing environment. (57b) and (57c), respectively. The D-alternatives are generated from the assertion by replacing the total domain D with a subdomain D ′ , as schematized in (57d).
(57) Only JOHN F read any papers.
(1) some P e,t but x e Q e,t = 1 if and only if a. some(P\{x})(Q) = 1;
Because "some P Q" is UE with respect to the restrictor P, condition (1a) entails condition (2). Nevertheless, because x ∈ ∅, (2) contradicts condition (1b). Hence, any sentence of the form "some P but x Q" is a contradiction.
(2) some(P\∅)(Q) = 1, or equivalently, some(P)(Q) = 1 For the purposes of this paper, it is enough to know that G-triviality is a type of L-triviality that affects grammaticality. 
The prejacent presupposition (57b), as argued by Gajewski (2011) and extended by Chierchia (2013) , is irrelevant for assessing the [D] feature of the weak NPI any. 13 Moreover, the asserted 13 Gajewski (2011) (1) *Only JOHN came in years.
a. John came in years. ∧ ∀x[x came in years
This idea also explains the lack of NPI-licensing effect of the covert O-operator, as seen in (8b) and (9b). In the following, I show that both syntactically well-formed LFs of (2) yield a G-triviality. Under the LF in (2a), according to the definition of O in (50), the prejacent inference S is asserted by the covert O F -operator, as schematized in (2a-ii). Thus, when the O D -operator is applied, the prejacent inference will also enter into the assessment of the [D] feature, contrary to the case of the only-sentence (57). Crucially, the prejacent inference (the underlined part) and the exhaustivity inference (the rest) are UE and DE with respect to the NPI any, respectively; thus overall the complement of O D is non-monotonic with respect to the NPI any. Alternatively, under the LF in (2b), the [F] and [D] features will be checked off simultaneously, generating a set of alternatives via point-wise functional application (Hamblin 1973) , as schematized in (2bii). Applying O affirms the prejacent and negates all the alternatives except the prejacent itself, yielding a contradiction.
(2) * JOHN F read any papers.
(John read a paper in the total domain D.)
(John and no one else read a paper in the total domain D.)
is DE with respect to the domain variable D. Therefore, any is licensed in (57), as it would be in any DE environments. It is worthy noting that the G-view conventionally assumes that exhaustification operators operate on propositional alternatives. Therefore, for both DP-only and VP-only, this convention requires the exhaustification domain to be a set of propositions, represented as "ALT(p)" in (58).
Following this convention strictly, the G-view of NPI-licensing would instead schematize the assertion of S as in (59). Here the F-alternatives are propositions of the form "y read some papers in the total domain D" where y is a contextually relevant individual.
This move does not change the polarity pattern of the assertion with respect to the D variable. It might not be easy to see the DE-ness of (59) with respect to D, but it is easy to prove it from the semantically equivalent formula (60), which is the conjunction of negated excludable F-alternatives: an F-alternative q is UE with respect to D, and thus its negation is DE with respect to D, and thus the conjunction of negated F-alternatives is DE with respect to D. 14
The G-view of NPI-licensing can be summarized as follows: the [D] feature of an NPI evokes the mandatory application of an O D -operator; if the constituent that O D attaches to is non-DE with respect to this NPI, employing O D yields a G-triviality. As for the case of only, the G-view shows that the asserted component of an only-clause is DE with respect to its unfocused part, which therefore can license NPIs.
Advantages of the G-view
Superior to previous studies on NPI-licensing, the G-view explicitly explains why NPIs cannot appear in non-DE environments. Moreover, this view is compatible with the strict DE condition and therefore is free from the problems that the Strawson DE analysis of NPI-licensing faces.
As pointed out by Lahiri (1998) and Gajewski (2011) , for example, the Strawson DE condition cannot account for the distributional pattern of NPIs under a definite description of the form "the+NP singular " or "both+NP": the left argument is Strawson DE but cannot license NPIs. Given these problematic cases, Wagner (2006) admits that other conditions, such as not being Strawson-UE (Lahiri 1998 , Cable 2002 , Guerzoni & Sharvit 2007 , are also required for licensing NPIs. (61a) and (62a) are not only presupposed but also asserted, as exemplified below. Hence the overall assertions of the sentences (61-62) are non-monotonic with respect to any, which therefore explains why the NPI any is not licensed.
(63) Assertion of (61) due to Gajewski (2011) : |student
Problems with the G-view
Previous works on the G-view have not yet discussed the phenomenon of Licensing Asymmetry. In this section, I will first show that the current G-view is indeed sufficient for analyzing the basic cases in (64), where only is associated with any or anyP. But this explanation is highly restricted; it cannot extend to cases like (65), where only is associated with any across an existentially quantificational expression, nor to cases like (66) that are subject to Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch.
(64) a. * John only read ANY F papers.
b. * John only read [any PAPERS] F , (he didn't read every book).
(65) a. * Mary only invited some students who read ANY F papers.
b. * Only some students who read ANY F papers passed the test.
(66) a. * John only read any PAPERS F .
b. * Only any BOYS F arrived.
A potential solution for Licensing Asymmetry
If we follow the G-view of NPI-licensing strictly, we would structure the LF of (64a) Chierchia's (2006 Chierchia's ( , 2013 assumption that the polarity item any is a variant of the existential indefinite some, we conjecture that its default F-alternatives are simply the scalar alternatives, as schematized in (67b). The semantics of (67a) 
(John didn't read all the papers in the total domain D.) 
Problem 1: Licensing Asymmetry with existentials
Nevertheless, the solution used above is highly restricted. If only is associated with any across an existential quantifier, the inference derived by negating the proper D-alternatives might do not contradict the asserted scalar inference. Consider (65a) for illustration. Due to the Complex NP Constraint, the NPI any must be interpreted within the relative clause of the existentially quantificational phrase some students. The following derivation shows that the meaning of the LF in (68a) is not contradictory. 
(Mary didn't invite any students who read all the papers in D.) 
(Mary didn't invite any students who read both a and b.)
(Mary invited some students who read a and some students who read b.)
To understand this problem from a more general perspective, recall how the G-view explains the NPI-licensing effect of negation: Claim 1 can easily extend to other DE environments, such as only, as we have seen in section 3.3. This is so because the D-alternatives will be non-excludable as long as the [D] feature is assessed in a DE context. Nevertheless, Claim 2 does not necessarily hold in other non-DE environments, such as the one seen in (68): even though the proper D-alternatives are excludable, negating them does not necessarily yield a G-triviality.
Problem 2: Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch
We have seen from section 3.3 that the asserted component of an only-sentence is DE with respect to any unfocused position of this sentence. Since the G-view takes the DEness of the asserted component as the only requirement for licensing weak NPIs, it cannot capture the phenomenon of Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch.
For instance, following the G-view, we would assume that the sentence in (66a) takes the LF in (69a). Applying only negates all the excludable F-alternatives and returns an assertion that is DE with respect to the D variable. Next, since the D-alternatives are all entailed by the assertion, using O D to check off the [D] feature of the NPI any does not yield a G-triviality. Therefore, if the LF in (69a) were possible, the NPI any should have been licensed in (66a), contra fact.
(69) * John only read any PAPERS F .
A new analysis
We have seen that the F-movement operation is needed to unify the distributional patterns of NPIs under DP-only and VP-only, especially for the facts related to Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch.
But, this operation has not yet been well-motivated. A natural move would be to incorporate Fmovement into the G-view of NPI-licensing and motivate F-movement based on the requirement of avoiding G-trivialities.
Why is it that a logical inference can motivate a syntactic operation? Chierchia (2013: 444) indicates that the structure-building apparatus (e.g., Merge, Move, Agree) and the inferential one are not radically different: "grammar only sees functional/logical material; logic sees functional/logical material and whether the lexical material is the same or different." G-triviality, in particular, is the type of L-triviality that takes effect in grammar.
Nevertheless, we have also seen that neither Wagner (2006) nor Chierchia (2006 Chierchia ( , 2013 can properly capture the distributional pattern of NPIs under only. Both theories predict that NPIs can appear in any Strawson DE or DE environment. And both theories predict that the asserted component of an only-sentence is DE with respect to any unfocused position. The phenomenon of Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch, however, suggests that the licensing status of an NPI in an onlysentence is not just determined by the polarity pattern of the environment where this NPI gets interpreted. For instance, compare the minimal pair in (70): despite the fact that the asserted component of the entire only-sentence is DE with respect to any in (70a) and UE with respect to any in (70b), both occurrences of any are not licensed. We can conclude that a pure monotonicitybased account cannot account for the distributional patter of NPIs under only. I argue that only is not just an NPI-licenser but also an "NPI-unlicenser." It is an NPI-licenser because it creates a DE environment in its unfocused part. It is also an NPI-unlicenser because interpreting an NPI within its syntactic complement makes this NPI not licensed. In the G-view of NPI-licensing, an NPI is unlicensed if and only if the assessment of its [D] feature yields a G-triviality. To this extent, we can say that the O D -operator can trigger an NPI-unlicensing effect, which occurs when O D is applied to a constituent that is non-DE with respect to an NPI.
To capture NPI-unlicensing effect of only, I propose that only, just like the covert O D -operator, can check off the grammatical feature [D] . A more general assumption is stated as follows: b. An alternative-generating feature that always takes "+" value (e.g., the [D] feature of any) must agree with the closest probe.
The locality constraint (71b) is exclusive to alternative-generating features that always take "+" value. 15 When an alternative-generating feature takes "+" value, it activates the corresponding alternatives; otherwise it does not. In Chierchia's (2013) system, the domain feature [D] and the scalar feature [σ ] of polarity items (including NPIs, free choice items (FCIs), and minimizers), if syntactically visible, always take "+" value, obligatorily activating D-alternatives and scalar alternatives. In contrast, the [σ ] feature of a regular scalar item (e.g., some) can take either "+" or "-" value, and hence the activation of the corresponding scalar alternatives is optional.
According to the assumptions in (71), contra the traditional G-view, the occurrence of DP-only in (70a) checks off not only the [F] feature of the focused item BOYS F but also the [D] feature of the NPI any D , as illustrated in (72b). There is thus no need to posit a covert O D -operator in the LF. In particular, the feature-checking operation on [D] , as we will see in section 4.1.3, gives rise to a G-triviality and "unlicenses" the NPI any: only negates the proper D-alternatives, returning an assertion that contradicts the prejacent presupposition of only. (74), where α and P stand for the syntactic restrictor (i.e., the left argument) and the scope (i.e., the right argument), respectively. The letter τ stands for an arbitrary semantic type. This definition follows the convention initiated by Horn (1969) : only presupposes the truth of the prejacent and asserts an exhaustivity inference. 16 (74) Semantics of DP-only
Following the Roothean convention of Alternative Semantics (Rooth 1985 (Rooth , 1992 (Rooth , 1996 , I use α 0 and α f ,d to represent the ordinary value and the focus-and-domain value of α, respectively. The ordinary value is simply the truth value. The focus-and-domain value of α forms the exhaustification domain; it denotes the union of the set of F-alternatives (written as " α f " or "F-ALT(α)") and the set of D-alternatives (written as " α d " or "D-ALT(α)"), composed point-wise as follows:
The proposed definition of DP-only differs from the definition by Wagner (2006) in (20) in the following two respects. First, only triggers a prejacent presupposition, 17 which is much stronger than Wagner's existential presupposition. Second, the exhaustification domain of only contains also the D-alternatives of the syntactic restrictor. To see how the proposed definition works in practice in cases without NPIs, consider the following example:
for any y such that y is someone's advisor(s) in w and y left in w, the proposition 'John's advisors left' entails the proposition 'y left'.) There are also other presuppositions triggered by only (such as the additive presupposition, see fn. 8). I ignore these presuppositions because they are not crucial for the purpose of this paper. semantically vacuous and would not yield a G-triviality. An example with schematized derivation is given in (77). The application of O D is semantically vacuous, because all the D-alternatives (i.e., members in S d ) are entailed by the asserted component of the only-sentence (i.e., S 0 ). The only difference between this analysis from the traditional G-view is that here only c-commands the focused item JOHN F but not the the NPI any.
(77) Only JOHN F read any papers.
(Only John read any papers in the total domain D.)
= S 0 (Only John read any papers in the total domain D.)
g. S 0 entails every member in S d .
For example, let D = {a, b} and JOHN F f = { j, m}, then:
(Mary read neither a nor b.)
The NPI-unlicenser use of DP-only
When an NPI any appears within the left argument of DP-only, only checks off both [F] and [D] features, and therefore its exhaustification domain consists of not only the focus value of its left argument but also the domain-value of its left argument. In the asserted component, applying only negates all the excludable alternatives, including the proper D-alternatives, yielding the inference in (78d). Crucially, (78d) contradicts the prejacent presupposition of only, as in (78e). Hence, the meaning of (78) is always undefined, which therefore explains why the NPI any is not licensed in this sentence.
(78) *Only any D BOYS F left.
S only DP 
4.2. VP-only association
Semantics of VP-only
In the case of VP-only association, if focus is interpreted in situ, the alternatives are all propositional. Following Rooth (1985 Rooth ( , 1992 , I schematize the semantics of VP-only as in (79). The letter S stands for the VP complement of only.
(79) Semantics of VP-only (without F-movement)
When F-movement takes place, VP-only is defined cross-categorically the same as DP-only. Now the two arguments α and P correspond to the F-moved phrase and the remnant VP, respectively.
(80) Semantics of VP-only (with F-movement)
In the absence of NPIs, F-movement is not motivated and therefore the exhaustification domain of only would be a set of propositions. A schematized example is given in the following.
(81) Sue only invited JOHN F 's advisors.
Let A w (x) = ιy[advisor Assuming F-movement to be conditional better controls the use of this operation. For instance, contrary to Wagner's (2006) predictions (seen in section 2.3.3), the new analysis predicts that Fmovement is not motivated in (83) and (84), because interpreting focus in situ does not yield a G-triviality: (83) has no NPI, while the NPI any in (84) is licensed by negation. 
Case 2: F-movement is motivated
In the case of DP-only association, we have seen that interpreting an NPI within the immediate syntactic complement of only yields a G-triviality, making the NPI unlicensed. In the case of VPonly association, interpreting focus in situ would also cause a G-triviality, but this G-triviality can be avoided by F-movement under certain configurations.
Let us first see why the two un-F-moved forms in (73a), repeated below, yield a G-triviality. a. Exhaustification domain of only:
(Mary didn't give John any books in any proper subdomain D ′ .) 18 Alternatively, we can also assume a larger exhaustification domain for only, namely, the set of propositions of the form "Mary gave some books in D ′ to y", as schematized in (1). This alternative set is point-wise composed from the D-alternatives of any D and the focus alternatives of JOHN F . Since this set includes all the D-alternatives in (86a-ii), exhaustifying over this set also yields an assertion that entails the inference in (86c).
(Mary gave John some books in the total domain D.)
e. (86c) contradicts (86d). For example, let D = {a, b}, then: In conclusion, in the case of VP-only association, F-movement is motivated if only c-commands an NPI and this NPI is not licensed within the prejacent of only. Note that the discussion above is irrelevant to overt F-movement. Since G-triviality is assessed at LF, the requirement of avoiding G-trivialities can only motivate covert movement. Hence, this requirement is not the cause of Moreover, under the new analysis, as long as the prejacent of only is non-DE with respect to an NPI, a contradiction arises between the prejacent presupposition and the inference of negating the proper D-alternatives. This generalization also applies to the case where only is associated with an NPI across an existential quantifier. For illustration, compare the following semantic derivation with the one in (68), which follows the traditional G-view. In sum, if the prejacent of only is non-DE with respect to the D variable of any, then regardless of whether F-movement takes place, using only to assess the [D] feature of any yields a contradiction between the prejacent presupposition and the negation of the proper D-alternatives, making the NPI any unlicensed.
Head Restriction
Recall that a focused head cannot undertake F-movement alone, because F-movement is phrasal movement. Hence, in (92), it is impossible to move the focused verb CUT F alone to the restrictor of only while leaving the NPI any in the scope of only.
(92) *John only CUT F any vegetables.
[ Moreover, if the quantifier raising of the anyP is blocked, the NPI any would not be licensed. For instance, the NPI any is not licensed in (95), a conditional where only is associated with the NP complement of any. First, the determiner any cannot take F-movement alone, ruling out the possibility in (95a). Second, since an only-associated focus cannot be moved from beneath only (Tancredi 1990, Beaver and Clark 2003) , the F-contained anyP cannot raise over only, ruling out the possibility in (95b). 
Conclusions
The goal of this paper has been to explain the distributional pattern of weak NPIs in only-sentences. The phenomenon of Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch suggests that the licensing status of an NPI in an only-sentence is constrained not only by the monotonicity pattern of the environment where this NPI gets interpreted, but also by syntactic factors in the LF of only-sentences.
I reviewed two representative analyses, namely, the F-movement theory by Wagner (2006) and the G-view of NPI-licensing by Chierchia (2006 Chierchia ( , 2013 . I showed that both analyses have clear advantages but also make incorrect predictions. First, neither analysis can properly explain the phenomenon of Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch. Both analyses assume that weak NPIs can be licensed in any Strawson DE or DE environment, and both analyses predict that the asserted component of an only-sentence is DE with respect to any unfocused position. Second, in Wagner's treatment, the F-movement operation in VP-only association is not well-motivated or properly controlled. Third, Chierchia's analysis cannot capture cases where only is associated with an NPI across an existential quantifier.
As an alternative to these approaches, I incorporated F-movement into the G-view by assuming that the requirement of avoiding G-trivialities can motivate covert F-movement. Moreover, I argued that only is not just an NPI-licenser but also an "NPI-unlicenser." To capture the latter role, I proposed that only, just like the covert O D -operator, can check off the grammatical feature [D] and operate on D-alternatives.
Compared with previous analyses, my proposal yields two new predictions. First, when an NPI is interpreted within the immediate complement of only, a contradiction arises between the exhaustivity assertion and the prejacent presupposition, making this NPI unlicensed. Second, in the case of VP-only association, this contradiction can be avoided via F-movement if the NPI does not appear within the F-moved phrase. These predictions explain why the distributional pattern of NPIs in only-clauses exhibits Licensed-Nonfocal Mismatch, as well as why VP-only association sometimes triggers F-movement.
